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Abstract
We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive
banking sector that shares information, as well as from other hidden lenders. The
presence of hidden lenders allows borrowers to conceal poor results from their banks
and, thus, restricts the contracts that can be obtained from the banking sector. In
equilibrium, borrowers obtain funds from both the banking sector and ine¢ cient hid-
den lenders simultaneously, so that di¤erent types of borrowers cannot be distinguished
by banks. This generates cross-subsidies between di¤erent borrowers that are observa-
tionally equivalent to the banking sector. We show that the cheaper the cost of hidden
borrowing, the lower is welfare and the lower is the variety of funding arrangements
in the banking sector. In particular, while high costs of hidden borrowing allow each
di¤erent (viable) type of borrower to access di¤erent terms from the banking sector, as
the cost of hidden borrowing falls, more and more borrowers face identical terms up to
the point where all borrowers who access the banking sector (which may include ine¢ -
cient ones) face identical terms. We generalize the model to allow for partially-hidden
lenders and obtain qualitatively similar results.
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1 Introduction
Firms and consumers have access to di¤erent sources of borrowing. Since loans may di¤er
in their seniority, covenants, and interest rates, this may induce an apparent pecking order
among them. However, loans may also di¤er in the extent of their informational opacity
with respect to other lenders. While some lenders perfectly share information through a
public credit registry, for example other lenders may have no involvement in such infor-
mation sharing. Borrowers may choose more-opaque loans in order to conceal information
from others.
This paper investigates the consequences of the presence of opaque loans for formal
bank loans in terms of the types of loans o¤ered and adopted, liquidation decisions, and
welfare. We argue that the presence of opaque lenders limits the contracting options of
other lenders: If all lenders perfectly share information, loans induce borrowers to reveal
their solvency at all times by setting interest rates that are highly responsive to repayment
schedules. However, if borrowers can secretly obtain funds, loan repayments might reect
not only a borrowers creditworthiness, but also her access to alternative loans. For this
reason, loans become less responsive to interim payments. A borrower may simultaneously
access both opaque and transparent loans even though more-opaque loans may be more
costly in terms of higher interest rates for the lenders. Consequently, di¤erent types of
borrowers that is with di¤erent abilities to repay might appear indistinguishable to the
formal banking sector and face the same borrowing terms. Furthermore, the presence
of opaque loans generates concealment costs and ine¢ cient liquidation policies driven by
cross-subsidies between borrowers. Overall welfare, can diminish with the availability and
a¤ordability of hidden loans, both as a result of ine¢ cient liquidation, and borrowers
accessing relatively expensive opaque funds.
Our results provide one explanation for the empirical observation that borrowers get
loans from apparently costly lenders without fully exhausting cheaper sources. Firms use
costly trade credit and personal loans from the owner before exhausting their credit lines
and while having free collateral.1 On the consumer side, Gross and Souleles (2002), for
example, report that in a large sample of credit card holders, almost 70 percent of those
borrowing on bankcards have positive housing equity. Our model suggest that a rationale
for this behavior is that by using alternative sources of borrowing that are not perfectly
1For example, in the 1998 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF), among the rms with
bank debt not exceeding the value of their land (a conservative estimate of rms with free collateral), 14.7
percent used trade credit and 13.5 percent used lines of credit.
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observable to their main lenders, borrowers can conceal their liquidity shocks.2
For example, missing a repayment can trigger a renegotiation with the bank and lead to
a higher future interest rate. This reects the banks renewed assessment of the borrowers
ability to repay. An e¤ort to renegotiate the loan may be costly for the borrower because
it would reveal information about current and future cash ows. In order to avoid this
penalty, an entrepreneur might borrow from elsewhere, taking a personal loan, for example,
to conceal the bad news that the enterprise has su¤ered a negative shock. In turn, this
makes missing a payment even worse news, as it reects a negative shock so large that
it is prohibitively costly to conceal. The resulting overall cost of renegotiation may be
su¢ ciently high that the nancier would repossess the asset or foreclose following a missed
payment.
We illustrate the interaction between publicly-observable and hidden borrowing more
formally in a two-period model where agents have access to an investment project that
yields cash ows correlated across time. They can fund the project through two sources: a
competitive banking sector that shares information, and an opaque lending sector. Banks
are senior claimants and seek to obtain information regarding borrowers through interim
payments. While most of our discussion views banks as providing exible long-term (two-
period) nancing, one could also interpret the banking sector as providing a sequence of
short-term loans.
Our rst result shows that if the alternative source of borrowing is su¢ ciently expen-
sive (or is absent), banking contracts will achieve rst-best. By rewarding higher interim
payments with lower future interest rates, the optimal contract gives borrowers incentives
to reveal their intermediate cash ows perfectly. However, with a viable alternative hidden
lender, a borrower might be tempted to borrow from that source in order to disguise her
type. The original lender in the banking sector anticipates this possibility. In general, this
will lead to a more-limited menu of repayment schedules in the optimal contract. Further,
we show that borrowers borrow from the opaque sector to make the interim repayment.
Thus, in equilibrium, borrowers are simultaneously borrowing from both the banking and
the opaque sectors. This is a well-documented phenomenon and, in our model, it is not a
result of behavioral biases. By imposing a distributional assumption on borrowerstypes,
2Other explanations have been posited to explain this apparent puzzle; for example, Laibson et al. (2003)
calibrate a model of life-cycle borrowing with time-inconsistent preferences, and Bertaut, Haliassos, and
Reiter (2009) discuss a model of separate mental accounts. The results of this paper assume fully rational
consumers and need not contradict such explanations, but can be seen as complementary to them.
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we fully characterize the menu of contracts. We show that as the cost of hidden borrowing
falls, the equilibrium changes from a continuum of contracts that fully separate borrowers
to a countable set of contracts each attracting a pool of borrowers. The pools get larger
when the cost of hidden borrowing falls, leading eventually to a single pooling contract
o¤ered in the banking sector. We also allow for partially-hidden lending and obtain similar
results.
We perform comparative statics exercises that lead to some empirical predictions. We
nd that more-expensive hidden lending improves the sorting of borrowers by banks. This
allows for greater variety of lending arrangements in the formal banking sector in the sense
that di¤erent types of borrowers are more likely to face di¤erent terms in the banking
sector. When hidden borrowing is su¢ ciently cheap, all borrowers face identical terms
in the banking sector. Thus, one could think of the sophistication of the banking sector
as depending on the cost of hidden lending. The e¤ect of increasing the cost of hidden
lending is, in general, similar to making it more transparent, so technological and regulatory
changes that improve information-sharing should have similar e¤ects. Furthermore, more-
expensive (or more-transparent) hidden lending leads to improved terms (that is, lower
interest rates) from the formal sector because it is more expensive for borrowers to conceal
their creditworthiness. In the presence of hidden lending, borrowers may liquidate projects
too seldom since there are cross-subsidies induced by concealment. Increasing the cost of
borrowing from hidden sources increases welfare, and naturally one might also suppose
that this increases the volume of loans initiated. Inuencing and regulating obscure or
opaque sources of funds can, therefore, help to improve exibility and the credit conditions
in more-formal sectors.
Related Literature and Supportive Evidence The historical and international evi-
dence on information sharing in the nancial sector is consistent with the predictions of our
model (see, for example, the edited volume Miller (2003), Hunt (2006), Jentzsch, (2007),
and Jappelli and Pagano (2006)). In particular, Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009), in
an investigation of rms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, conclude that
information sharing is associated with improved availability and lower cost of credit to
rms(p. 1). In Cowen and De Gregorio (2003) show evidence from Chile that informa-
tion sharing increased the volume of lending. There are alternative explanations for these
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facts;3 however, the previous literature has discussed the complexity of contracts very little.
Our model suggests that higher availability of creditor information should lead to debt con-
tracts with more-exible repayment terms and schedules, rather than, say, xed repayment
levels at xed dates. This seems consistent with anecdotal evidence on the development of
mortgage contracts in the U.K., for example, where there has been growth in exible (or
lifestyle) mortgages at a time when consumer credit-scoring has developed. In contrast,
at the rm level, the empirical accounting literature has recently paid attention to the
increasing use of nancial innovations such as o¤-balance sheet lease nancing as a form
of opaque borrowing (Cornaggia et al, 2010; Zechman, 2011). This opaque borrowing has
contributed to making the analysis of balance sheets by creditors and ratings less precise
(Franzen et. al., 2009).
In this paper, the banking sector cannot write contracts that make payments depend
on the amount borrowed from the hidden lender. This is a natural consequence of the
assumption that the banking sector cannot observe this borrowing. This paper is, therefore,
related to a growing literature on non-exclusive contracts and hidden savings.
Our focus on di¤erent lending sectors that vary in the information that they have,
as well as the simple comparative statics analysis that this allows, distinguishes our pa-
per from the literature on exclusivity. For example, there are models of non-exclusivity
with simultaneous contracting (Bisin and Guaitoli, (2004), Jaynes (1978), and Arnott and
Stiglitz (1991) in the context of insurance markets), with sequential access to loans (Bizer
and DeMarzo (1992)), and with nancial intermediaries who are ex-ante identical.
In the optimal contracts that we characterize, interim payments provide useful informa-
tion that can allow for more-e¢ cient outcomes. This mirrors observations in Allen (1985)
and Dionne and Lasserre (1985). Hidden borrowing or savings (as in Cole and Kocher-
lakota (2001)) can, therefore, create ine¢ ciency in these environments by reducing the
information available from interim payments.
A feature of our analysis is that we vary the cost of borrowing from the hidden source.
Allen (1985) and others focus on the case where this cost is equal to the social planners
rate.4 Innes (1990), in order to generate monotonicity in repayment schedules, considers
3See Padilla and Pagano, 1997; Jappelli and Pagano, 1993; and, more broadly, the discussion in Jappelli
and Pagano, 2006 for alternative, but related models of information sharing.
4The general model of Doepke and Townsend (2004), as illustrated in their example in Section 7.1, allows
for this more general interest rate; however, as in Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) and Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2003), they consider hidden saving and insurance rather than hidden borrowing and focus on numerical
rather than analytical solutions.
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the case where money can be repaid immediately so that the cost of borrowing is essentially
zero.
Finally, a key element of the model is that a lender may not perfectly observe all the
loans that a borrower may hold. Empirically, this is certainly the case. For example,
although information sharing takes place through credit bureaus, many lenders choose
neither to pay for access to credit bureaus nor to provide information to them. Trade
credit, informal black-market lending, and personal loans to entrepreneurs subsequently
used in their rms are clear examples. Further examples include consumer credit, store
credit, payday lenders, and other sources that do not participate in organized information-
gathering credit bureaus, both in developing countries and elsewhere, both currently and
historically.5 For instance, Barron and Staten (2003) highlight that in some Latin American
countries, there are comprehensive credit histories on consumers but only on loans held
by commercial banks(pp.273-4). Note, further, that even when a lender has access to a
credit bureau, the costs associated with accessing and processing the relevant information
may lead lenders to obtain and use this information only in particular circumstances. Such
circumstances would include the loan-approval stage, missed payments, and renegotiation;
otherwise, there is unlikely to be continual monitoring. In this paper, we simply take it for
granted that some types of borrowing are not commonly observed by all lenders.
2 The Model
Although the underlying economic mechanisms have wider applicability, we focus the model
on the particular example of a small business that is raising funds for a capital-investment
project that will generate an interim and a nal return. Because these pay-outs are pos-
itively correlated, there is additional information at the interim stage that is useful for
assessing creditworthiness. The rm has access to both a competitive banking sector and
a hidden lender. One can think of the hidden lender as a personal loan to the entrepreneur
secretly diverted to the rm.
We introduce a two-period model to consider the interaction between alternative sources
of borrowing: a transparent banking sector and an opaque hidden lender (or lending sector).
5For example, in the U.S., payday lenders do not share information with banks (Elliehausen and Lawrence
(2001) and Mann and Hawkins (2007)). However, it has been shown that their presence alters the bor-
rowerspayment of other loans. In particular, mortgage delinquency after an aggregate liquidity shock is
signicantly lower in areas where there are payday lenders (Morse (2007)).
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2.1 Lending Sectors
In the transparent sector, credit is provided by a continuum of agents that we call banks.
Banks are risk-neutral deep pockets, and there is competition among them. Banks share
information, and so the borrowing position of any borrower with a bank is perfectly ob-
servable and veriable among all banks. We normalize the gross riskless market interest
rate of this banking sector to one.
The key assumptions concerning the banking sector are that it is competitive and
that it shares information. More formally, we assume that banks compete in two stages
(i) to initiate the loan, and (ii) at an interim stage following the rst repayment. To
make competition at the interim stage relevant, we assume that, after the rst repayment,
renancing the loan at the interim stage (that is, repaying the full amount borrowed or
repaying whatever is left following the rst repayment and taking out another loan from
another bank) entails no penalty for the borrower.6 Further, we assume that banks perfectly
share the information about the borrowers payments and outstanding loans. In particular,
this implies that they cannot simply replicate hidden lending, as they have no means to
hide such contracts from other banks.
Banks compete with each other in the rst stage by making sequential o¤ers which
consist of menus fp; q(p)g of rst-period repayments, p, and associated second-period re-
payments, q(p). In the rst stage, when the loan is initiated, a bank is picked at random
to make an o¤er. If it makes no o¤er, the process ends and the lender receives no loan. If
the borrower holds the banks o¤er, an alternative bank is selected at random to observe
the borrowers current contract and make a second o¤er. If the borrower strictly prefers
the rst banks o¤er, no further o¤ers are made and the lender either takes the rst o¤er
or no o¤er at all. If the borrower prefers the second banks o¤er, then he holds that o¤er
provisionally and, again, another bank is selected at random to observe the current o¤er
and make an alternative o¤er, and so on. This structure of competition ensures that there
is never an o¤er that is shielded from a countero¤er as in Bennardo et al (2010).
Competition at the second interim stage is similar, except that initially the borrower
has chosen an existing repayment schedule, from the menu against which future o¤ers may
6The opting out assumption seems empirically reasonable in many markets of long-term debt. Mortgages,
for example, have small or no penalties for early payment (see Green and Wachter, 2005). Lines of credit
are often used for long-term borrowing and are also fully pre-payable with no penalty. Bonds are often
callable (see Sundaresan, 2009). Private debt agreements are, in general, not explicitly callable, but they
are frequently renegotiated (Roberts and Su, 2009; report a 90-percent renegotiation rate among publicly
traded companies and nancial institutions).
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be compared. In the second stage, after observing the menu fp; q(p)g o¤ered by the existing
bank and the particular repayment schedule  p and associated q(p) that any particular
borrower has adopted, banks compete by making sequential o¤ers of an alternate rst- and
second-period payments ep(p; q(p); fp; q(p)g) and eq(p; q(p); fp; q(p)g) that, as suggested by
the notation, depend on the initial schedule and the option chosen. In both stages, we
model the sequence of o¤ers as open-ended. The next bank observes the existing contract
of the borrower in the rst-stage bank and can o¤er an alternative rst and second payment
to each borrower. If the next banks o¤er is taken, a further o¤er can arise from the next
competing bank; which observes the original menu o¤ered, the schedule that was picked
from that menu and the last alternative o¤er taken. The process continues until no further
o¤ers are made.
Note that if banks could lock borrowers into long-term contracts with no opportunity to
renegotiate, then information-sharing would be irrelevant in this model. The assumption
that banks compete at each stage and that loans can be renanced without penalty rules
this out. The model can, alternatively, be understood as characterizing a sequence of two
short-term contracts. In this latter interpretation, the counterpart to the exibility of the
long-term contract would be the variety of short-term contracts o¤ered in the second stage.
In addition to the transparent banking sector, we introduce an alternative opaque, or
hidden, lending sector that lends at a at repayment rate r > 1; for now, we take the rate
as exogenous. We discuss endogenizing this interest rate below.
A key feature of this alternative borrowing source is that it does not share information
with the rest of the nancial system. That is, the borrowing position of any borrower in
the opaque sector is not observable by banks. Further, we model the opaque sector as a
junior lender. This is certainly consistent with an interpretation as a concealed loan from
the rm owner to the rm.7 In our model, lenders exogenously belong to either the banking
sector or the opaque sector.
2.2 Borrowers
Demand for funds comes from borrowers who require funds for an investment project and
who are heterogeneous in the quality of their projects. They are risk-neutral and maximize
total consumption across periods.
The timing of the model is as follows:
7 In terms of seniority, it is also consistent with trade credit or credit cards. Other types of hidden
lending, including black-market lending, may be more ambiguous with respect to seniority.
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At t = 0, each borrower does not know her type. In order to raiseD units of funding nec-
essary to invest in the project, the borrower can chose among the di¤erent o¤ers available
of rst- and associated second-period debt repayment schedules fp; q(p)g. Second-period
payments may be contingent on rst-period ones.
At t = 12 , each borrower privately learns the type of her project, which is parametrized
by , where  is distributed on [0; 1]. At this point, the borrower can either costlessly
liquidate the project for D, and fully repay the loan, or continue with the project and
choose a repayment schedule.8
At t = 1, a borrower realizes a cash ow  that corresponds to her type. At this
stage, the borrower may also switch to a competing bank o¤er (ep; eq) where the nature of
competition is outlined above. She can choose to borrow funds from the opaque lending
source that is hidden from the banks. A loan of the opaque lender is junior to the bank
loan, and banks do not observe it. The borrower can use these funds either to consume or
to choose one of the repayment schedules from the menu and repay p to the bank.
At t = 2, the project is successful and delivers B+ with probability . Otherwise, the
project fails and delivers only . In both cases, seniority of debt is such that the borrower
repays q(p) to the bank rst and then repays opaque lenders up to rd. The borrower
consumes all the remaining funds.
The parameter  represents the creditworthiness of the borrower since the expected
nal cash ow of the project is positively correlated with its interim cash ow. Note that,
overall, a project of type  generates a net present value of  D++(B+)+(1 ) =
 D+ B+ 2. In particular, the best potential project, a project of type  = 1, generates
an expected net present value  D + B + 2. Low values for the overall net present value
suggest (though, obviously, depending on the distribution of types) that a high proportion
of projects are ine¢ cient. In particular, D  2 + B implies that no projects should be
funded, while B  D implies that all projects are e¢ cient and should be funded. With
intermediate values of the net present value of a project, only projects with   l := D B2
are e¢ cient.
The following diagram summarizes both the borrowers actions and the payo¤s required
and generated by the investment project.
8We model this option to stop the project as a costless liquidation at a very early stage; but supposing
that the agent were able to recover a su¢ ciently large salvage value at an early stage would generate similar
qualitative results.
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Summary of Timing
Borrowers and lenders are risk-neutral, and every agent seeks to maximize the sum of
their rst- and second-period incomes.
2.3 Simplifying assumptions
We add several auxiliary assumptions that help to simplify the analysis.
First, we assume that banks weakly prefer renegotiation-proof contracts. In the absence
of such an assumption, more-general contracts could arise in period 0, but renegotiation
would lead to the same outcomes characterized by the model.9
Second, for expositional purposes, we suppose that any particular borrower obtains all
of his loans from the banking sector from a single bank; that is, each borrower only uses one
bank at a time. This can be justied by small transaction costs that ensure that a borrower
will borrow from a single bank when otherwise indi¤erent. In terms of borrowersoutcomes
and welfare, this is without loss of generality. Given that information is shared, di¤erent
banks o¤er contracts that depend on the overall borrowing position in the banking sector.
All banks have the same seniority and in case of default are compensated proportionately
to their outstanding loans. Borrowing from multiple banks does not a¤ect consumption or
9For example, banks could o¤er a repayment schedule with an extremely high second-period interest
rate that would surely be renegotiated at t = 1. Since banks are competitive, the new renegotiated interest
rate would make banks break even, conditioning on this new information. The outcomes and payo¤s under
renegotiated and renegotiation-proof contracts are identical, so the role of this assumption is to emphasize
the long-term nature of the contract.
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liquidation decisions for borrowers, or prots for banks (given the nature of competition,
banks make zero prots).
Next, we assume that a borrower cannot owe more than she can possibly repay in the
best possible state (that is, no more than B + 2). It can be understood as a no fraud
condition that prevents borrowers from consuming in the interim period with the intention
of defaulting for sure in the future.10 This is a reasonable assumption, since most legal
systems allow for punishment above limited liability (i.e., prison or personal liability) if it
is found (perhaps with some probability) that a borrower did not intend to repay in any
possible state of the world.11
Finally, we make parametric restrictions that preclude some trivial and uninteresting
cases. Specically, we assume that D > 2, which ensures that no borrower can repay for
sure, and D > B > D   2, which ensures that all types of borrowers will default to
a di¤erent extent if the project is unsuccessful (so, from the lenderspoint of view, they
really are di¤erent types). In particular, the second restriction implies that some projects
are e¢ cient and should be funded, while others are not.
3 Equilibrium
A bank o¤er at t = 0 consists of a menu of repayment schedules fp; q(p)g. A bank strategy
is an o¤er that could depend on the full history of o¤ers up to that point. After the initial
stage of bank competition is concluded and the borrower has accepted an o¤er, she has to
decide whether to pursue the project at t = 12 , or to liquidate. If the borrower does not
liquidate, she has to decide, at t = 1, which schedule from the current menu to choose. As
described above, the borrower can choose to stay with her current bank for the nal period
or switch to another bank. Note that, if on the nal schedule chosen, p > , the borrower
needs to fund any shortfall for the rst payment by borrowing from the hidden source.
Proposition 1 provides a preliminary result that puts limits on the contracts that the
banking sector might o¤er in equilibrium. It is a consequence of the potentially unlimited
sequence of o¤ers and the structure of competition between banks, described in Section
10Since the hidden sector is more expensive than bank borrowing, no borrower accesses funds from the
hidden sector to consume in the interim period and repay in the good state. Therefore, borrowing to
consume in the interim would be worthwhile only if the borrower intended to default for sure.
11Note that such a borrowing limit requires the payo¤ to become veriable in case of default. We believe,
that it is plausible that if the project fails, triggering liquidation and investigation,  becomes veriable
but in the absence of a liquidation proceedings, it is not. Introducing a small verication cost in Period 2,
in the spirit of the costly state verication literature (Townsend, 1979; Gale and Hellwig, 1985), would not
a¤ect the qualitative results.
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2.1.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium the menu o¤ered can have no observable cross subsidies;
that is, a bank must break even on each p, q(p) schedule taken in equilibrium.
Proof. The proof of this and all subsequent results appear in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that conditional on the information known in the banking sector
every contract must break even for each observationally distinct type of borrower. That
is, there can be no cross-subsidies between borrowers who are perceived as di¤erent by
the banking sector. The intuition here is that if during a round of competition a bank
observed a set of borrowers that were subsidizing other borrowers, it could o¤er improved
terms only to them. These borrowers would switch banks, leaving their previous bank with
only subsidized borrowers and, thus, losses. This is the case in both stages of competition
and implies that, overall, contracts must break even. Note that, given that banks compete
sequentially, the argument of Proposition 1 can be easily extended from the menu o¤ered
in equilibrium to any deviation o¤er.
Among contracts that satisfy these restrictions, the assumption that borrowers do not
know their own type at stage 0 selects the contract that maximizes ex-ante welfare. The
full equilibrium conguration turns out to depend crucially on the interest rate at which
the hidden sector lends. In particular, if the interest rate is su¢ ciently high (r > 2  ),
then opaque lending is too expensive to be used to conceal a bad realization of , making it
irrelevant. Instead, if the interest rate is very low, then it is easy for lower-type borrowers
to mimic higher-type ones.
Note that, regardless of the amount borrowed, the opaque lender will always be repaid
if the good state is realized and will always face default in the bad state. This follows from
the seniority of bank debt. Thus, the break-even rate for r is 1 , regardless of the pool
of borrowers that the hidden lender attracts. This would be the endogenous rate for the
opaque sector if there were no other frictions or ine¢ ciencies. However, whether we think of
the opaque lending sector as trade credit, a credit card, personal loans to an entrepreneur,
or an informal lender, it is reasonable to believe that the interest rate charged could be
above this break-even rate for example, if there are other uses or users of this source of
lending. Therefore, we study situations in which r  1 .12
12Note that the model leads to a break-even rate that is independent of the amount borrowed, and we
simply assume that the markup that the hidden lender charges above it is also independent. In application,
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3.1 Expensive hidden borrowing
In this section, we explore the implications of an expensive opaque sector. When the
interest rate r is bigger than 2  , borrowing from the opaque lender is so expensive that it
is irrelevant. As a result, there is full separation among those types that borrow that is,
each di¤erent type repays the banking sector a di¤erent interim payment. The intuition is
that there is no opportunity for banks, at stage 1, to o¤er a more attractive contract to any
borrower contingent on observable information, a borrowers surplus is maximized; here,
the observable information is, in e¤ect, the agents type. Moreover, since this outcome
leads to e¢ cient liquidation decisions, and borrowers retain all the (maximized) surplus,
this is the outcome that they prefer at the ex-ante stage where contracts are determined.
Proposition 2 When the opaque sector lends at a su¢ ciently high interest rate (r >
2 
 ), there exists a fully separating equilibrium where all banks o¤er the same equilibrium
contract. This contract is a contingent one, where the interim payment is equal to the
rst-period cashow, and the corresponding nal payment fully reects the information
implied by the revealed rst-period cashow. Liquidation at t = 12 is at the e¢ cient level,
l := D B2 and the equilibrium achieves rst-best.
Note that if there is no hidden lender, then, as a corollary of Proposition 2, the outcome
is rst-best. This follows since the absence of a hidden lender corresponds to an innitely
high interest rate (r !1) from the opaque sector.
It is also worth noting that borrowers obtain all the surplus generated since banks are
competitive and earn no prots. Since hidden lenders are prohibitively expensive, they are
inactive. Thus, with expensive hidden lending, the rst-best is achieved, and borrowers
retain all the surplus from projects that are nanced.
Formally, beyond the equilibrium described in Proposition 2, there are many other
essentially observationally equivalent equilibria. That is, the o¤ered menu could include
many other redundant fp; q(p)g schedules that are never taken up and that have no e¤ect
on outcomes (for example, schedules with very high ps and qs), or where some banks (that,
in any case, earn no expected prots) o¤er menus that are never taken up. Henceforth, we
ignore such equilibria.
this is justied because borrowers may be able to obtain several small loans from di¤erent lenders (e.g.
di¤erent credit cards, di¤erent payday lenders or both simultaneously). Given that they do not share
information, they cannot condition on other loans.
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Finally, except for these observationally equivalent equilibria, there are no other equilib-
ria. This follows since the fully separating equilibrium achieves the rst-best and maximizes
the surplus for borrowers at t = 0; instead, any pooling equilibrium must involve ine¢ cient
liquidation and/or hidden borrowing and so less surplus for borrowers. This would leave
an opportunity for a rival bank to o¤er a more attractive contract.
3.2 Cheap hidden borrowing
In this section, we explore equilibrium outcomes when the opaque sector is relatively
cheap that is, when r < 2  . Note, in particular, that this regime includes the case
where there are no frictions in the opaque sector and r is equal to 1 .
We start by describing some general features of any equilibria. In particular, we demon-
strate that there will be some pooling among di¤erent types of borrowers with regard to
their interim payments. Further, banks cannot distinguish the di¤erent types within a
pool of borrowers who all make the same interim repayment. Given that banks break even
within each observable pool of borrowers, it follows that, within such a pool, borrowers
will cross-subsidize each other.
Proposition 3 When the hidden lenders interest rate is su¢ ciently low (r < 2  ), there
cannot be an equilibrium where a continuum of borrowers are able to fully separate. Further,
in any equilibrium with borrowing, borrowers types can be partitioned, with each pool of
borrowers paying a di¤erent interim payment; that is, there is some countable n and 0 =
1 > 1 > ::: > n 1 > n  0 where all types  2 (i 1; i) make the same interim
payment.
The intuition here is that if two similar types can fully separate, then, by borrowing
a littlefrom the hidden lender, a lower type can mimic a higher type and will be better
o¤ overall. That is, by borrowing marginally, the borrower can a¤ect the interest rate on
infra-marginal outstanding debt. As a result, Proposition 3 implies that when r < 2  ,
in any equilibrium, all borrowers belong to some pool i.e., no borrower is able to fully
separate.
Thus, compared to the outcome in Proposition 2, which shows that when r > 2  a
continuum of contract contingencies arises, here, with a cheaper lender, only a countable
number of contingencies arises. That is, contracts are simpler or, equivalently, less exible
when hidden borrowing is relatively cheap.
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We can further characterize equilibrium contracts. In particular, we argue that no
borrower consumes in the interim period. The intuition here is that if some borrowers
are consuming in the interim period, it is less costly for them to pay a higher interim
payment than it is for a type who is borrowing to access the same contract. A rival bank
can therefore cherry-pick these higher types of borrowers at the interim period by o¤ering
a slightly higher interim payment and a lower nal payment this cannot be the case in
equilibrium, since this entails losses for the original lending bank.
Lemma 1 No borrowers consume in the interim period (that is, p()   for all ).
Following Propositions 3 and Lemma 1, the presence of a relatively cheap hidden lender
restricts the bankscontractual options, forcing the contract to be less contingent on in-
termediate payments. As the interest rate of the hidden lender falls, banks nd it harder
to distinguish between borrowers. Note that, within a pool of indistinguishable borrowers,
the interest rate between t = 1 and t = 2 is the same for all borrowers, regardless of their
creditworthiness. Within this pool of indistinguishable borrowers, higher-quality borrowers
cross-subsidize lower-quality borrowers.
In general, the lower the cost of borrowing from the hidden sector, the more easily
a lower type of borrower can imitate a marginally better type and, intuitively, an infra-
marginally better type of borrower. This intuition suggests that the top pool of borrowers,
between 1 and 1, as described in Proposition 3, must get broader as the cost of borrowing
from the hidden lender decreases. Equivalently, a lower cost of hidden borrowing leads to a
greater range of di¤erent types of borrowers all adopting the same repayment schedule. As
we describe below, this intuition is consistent with results for uniformly distributed types.
The general case can be further characterized. In particular, interim competition sug-
gests that in equilibrium the highest type in a pool of borrowers cannot be borrowing from
the hidden lender. This can be established through a proof by contradiction. If every type
in a pool of borrowers obtains funds from the hidden borrower, another bank at the interim
stage could o¤er this pool of borrowers a more attractive contract (with a lower interim
payment) that requires less hidden borrowing and is protable for the bank. This proof is
formally stated in the Appendix and allows us to establish the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that there is an equilibrium with n pools of borrowers, then for
the ith pool that is for types  2 (i 1; i) the interim payment, p, is equal to i 1 and
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the nal period payment is D i 1 (1 )E(j2[i;i 1]) . Moreover, i satises
r   1
1   (i 1   i) = E(j 2 [i; i 1])  E(j 2 [i+1; i]) (1)
for i = 1; :::; n  1 and n = maxf0; eng where
r   1
1   (n 1   en) = E(j 2 [en; n 1])  D   B1   + en 1 + 1   : (2)
Proposition 4 denes a system of n equations in the the n unknowns 1; :::; n. For given
parameter values, it is straightforward to determine the solution (or possibly solutions) for
all values of n, assess the feasibility of these candidate equilibria (that is ensure that the
solutions are in the the range 1 > 1 > :::n  0). In principle, it then remains to compare
the feasible solutions to determine the equilibrium contract, noting that competition among
banks at stage 1 implies that the equilibrium contract must maximize welfare amongst all
possible candidate contracts that satisfy (1) and (2).
Equation (1) is a direct implication of the incentive compatibility constraint of the lower
member of a pool. It has an intuitive interpretation. A large pool is easier to sustain when
r is low so imitating better types is cheapand when the average quality of the borrowers
in the next-lower pool is worse. Given one pool, equation (1) determines the size of the
pools immediately above or below it, generating n 1 conditions for n pools. Equation (2)
uses the indi¤erence of the last borrower of the last pool between investing or liquidating
and is the condition that closes the system.
In order to provide a complete characterization we assume from now on that types are
uniformly distributed.
Proposition 5 If   U [0; 1], formal and hidden lending in equilibrium is uniquely deter-
mined.
1. If r  2  there is full separation of borrower types with each type  > l = D B2
paying  at the interim stage and q = D (2 ) as a nal payment.
2. If 2  > r  3 2 there are innite countable pools where
i = 1  2  r   
1  

1  D   B
2
 1  +2r 31  i
1  +2r 31 
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for i = 1; 2; ::: where all borrowers of type (i; i 1] make an interim payment of i 1
and a nal payment q = 2D 2i 1 (1 )(i+i 1)2 .
3. If 3 2 > r there is a single pool of borrowers of type  2 (+2D 2B+2r 3+2r+1 ; 1] who
make an interim payment of 1 and a nal payment of q = B 4r++2D B+2r+2rD 3+2r+1 .
The regime in the range 2  > r  3 2 contains multiple pools. The regime converges
smoothly to the other two. In the range 2  > r  3 2 , equation (1) requires that the
mass of borrowers accessing the nth contract is a fraction +2r 31  2 (0; 1) of the mass
of borrowers accessing the n   1th contract. As r ! 2  the term +2r 31  converges to
1 leading to an equilibrium with innite almost-equally sized small pools, covering the
borrowers in the range (1; D B2 ); which resembles the fully separating equilibrium. As r
grows, each pool n becomes bigger relative to the next lower pool n + 1. When r ! 3 2
the term +2r 31  converges to zero and the rst pool covers most of the borrowers. When
r > 3 2 only one pool can exist; the cross subsidies between borrowers lead to n <
D B
2
so liquidation is ine¢ cient.
In the range 2  > r  3 2 , the top contract (high quality borrowers) accounts for the
greatest fraction of overall borrowing and pools become smaller towards the bottom. There
are innite pools and the bottom pool can be considered as arbitrarily small. This implies
no cross subsidies at the very bottom and therefore e¢ cient liquidation decisions, i.e. as
i ! 1, i ! D B2 :Thus throughout this range for the cost of hidden borrowing, only
e¢ cient projects are conducted, and all ine¢ cient projects are liquidated. The following
corollary to Proposition 5 demonstrates that the lower the cost of hidden borrowing, the
lower is 1 and so the higher the fraction of borrowers who pool in the top contract by
the banking sector. Indeed, it shows more generally that as the cost of hidden borrowing
falls, the highest contracts account for a larger share of borrowers. It is in this sense
that a high cost of hidden borrowing is associated with a greater proportion of borrowers
accessing a greater variety of contracts or with increased nancial complexity in the formal
banking sector.
Corollary 1 If   U [0; 1], and 2  > r  3 2 then didr > 0 for all i.
Given the characterization in Proposition 5, it is simple to characterize welfare and
show that it increases as the cost of hidden borrowing increases.
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Corollary 2 If   U [0; 1], welfare is given by
W :=
 
1  D B2
2
for r  2 
1+r
2 
 
1  D B2
2
for 2   r  3 2
8 r+1
(+2r+1)2
 
1  D B2
2
for 3 2  r  1
. (3)
Thus it is non-decreasing in r and strictly increasing in r for 2  > r.
Within the fully separating equilibrium the rst-best is achieved and welfare is constant.
In the range where multiple pools exist, liquidation is e¢ cient, but pools become smaller,
the larger the r. The reduction in borrowing dominates the higher cost of borrowing and
welfare grows with r: In the single-pool equilibrium, lower r leads to more borrowing and
less e¢ cient liquidation, these two e¤ects again dominate the lower cost of borrowing, so
welfare is increasing in r: Consistent with the convergence of the di¤erent regimes, there is
smooth pasting of welfare across them.
4 Partially-Hidden Borrowing
Next, we modify the model slightly to allow for a partially-hidden lender. We introduce the
possibility that the banking sector observes the level of hidden borrowing by the borrower
with some probability (1 h). With probability h, borrowing from the non-banking sector
remains hidden. A rationale for this modeling assumption is that the banking sector
investigates each of its borrowers and obtains full information about the borrowing position
of each with some probability (1  h).
Once a borrower is successfully investigated, her borrowing position with all possible
alternative lenders is perfectly known by the whole banking sector. In this case, the banking
sector will learn the borrowers type perfectly by viewing her borrowing position, and in
the continuation, full separation is achieved with certainty. However, if the borrower is
found to be borrowing from the opaque sector, then she must incur a cost, s per-unit of
hidden borrowing.
Thus, the model with probabilistic observability of the hidden borrowing is like a switch-
ing model in which, with probability (1 h), full separation is achieved with certainty, and,
with probability h, looks like the model of the previous sections. In this latter case, the
only di¤erence is that, from the borrowers point of view, the costs and benets of the
hidden borrowing need to be recalculated since, with probability (1 h), hidden borrowing
is useless and entails a penalty s per-unit of hidden borrowing.
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In fact, once the alternative borrowing remains hidden, the rest of the model with
probabilistic observation of the hidden borrowing can be fully solved by realizing that,
in e¤ect, the cost of borrowing from the hidden source is now hr+(1 h)sh instead of just
r. Borrowing one unit from the hidden source costs r with probability h and costs s
with probability (1  h). It produces some concealment benet to the borrower only with
probability h, so the whole cost has to be re-scaled by 1=h.
We write r(h; s) := hr+(1 h)sh as the e¤ective interest rate when borrowing from the
opaque sector remains hidden with probability h; the rate of interest is r when borrowing
remains hidden; and the penalty cost, or cost of early repayment, when the banking sector
observes the borrowing is s. With this notation, we obtain the following results, which are
similar to those in the fully-hidden case:
Proposition 6 If   U [0; 1], equilibrium formal and hidden lending is uniquely deter-
mined.
1. If the opaque sector lends at a su¢ ciently high e¤ective interest rate r(h; s)  2 
there is full separation of borrower types with each type  > l = D B2 paying  at
the interim stage and q = D (2 ) as a nal payment.
2. If the opaque sector lends at an intermediate e¤ective interest rate 2  > r(h; s) 
3 
2 there is a continuum of pools where
i = 1  2  r(h; s)   
1  

1  D   B
2
 1  +2r(h;s) 31  i
1  +2r(h;s) 31 
for i = 1; 2; ::: where all borrowers of type (i; i 1] make an interim payment of i 1
and a nal payment q = 2D 2i 1 (1 )(i+i 1)2 .
3. If the opaque sector lends at a su¢ ciently low e¤ective interest rate 3 2 > r(h; s)
there is a single pool of borrowers of type  2 (+2D 2B+2r(h;s) 3+2r(h;s)+1 ; 1] who make an
interim payment of 1 and a nal payment of q = B 4r(h;s)++2D B+2r(h;s)+2rD 3+2r(h;s)+1 .
The functional form of the welfare equation and the incentive-compatibility conditions
are similar to those of the basic model, so comparative statics are analogous to those of
Section 3.2. First, note that r(h; s) is increasing in r and s, but decreasing in h; that
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is, it increases as hidden lending becomes more transparent. As in Section 3.2, and, in
particular, Corollary 2, welfare is increasing in r(h; s).
Transparency, as captured by (1 h), has both direct and indirect e¤ects on welfare. The
direct e¤ect prevents borrowers from accessing costly hidden lending, and unambiguously
benets welfare. The indirect e¤ect operates through r(h; s) in the same way that raising
the cost of borrowing from the hidden sector operates in Section 3.2, where the lower
aggregate level of hidden borrowing and more e¢ cient liquation decisions (when r(h; s) is
su¢ ciently low) outweigh the costs of more expensive hidden borrowing. Overall, therefore,
more transparency raises welfare. Similarly, increasing the cost of hidden borrowing (either
through r or s) operates through changing the e¤ective cost of hidden borrowing r(h; s)
and so increases welfare, analogous to the results on increasing r in Section 3.2.
Note that our analysis is related to the literature on the interactions between direct
screening of lenders by actively investigating them and indirect screening that can be
achieved by o¤ering them a menu of contracts, as in Manove et al. (2001). While in most
models these are seen as substitutes, in our model they are complements. That is, an
increase in (1   h) leads to more information about some borrowers directly and also to
a more informative equilibrium with regard to the other borrowers, who may have loans
from the alternative sector that remain hidden.13
Our results show that changing the transparency of the alternative hidden lenders can
have an impact on the types of contracts that the banking sector provides and in general
on borrowing patterns and the e¢ ciency of loans. For example, if payday lenders are a
major source of funds used for concealment, forcing them to disclose information would
reduce the use of payday loans and lead to a better sorting of risks from banks. Conversely,
information-protection regulation that limits information sharing across lenders should lead
to a higher fragmentation of the sources that a given borrower uses and, in general, harms
welfare when compared to full disclosure.
5 Conclusions
We present a model of nancing for an investment project, with central mechanisms that
have wide applicability in particular, the interaction of di¤erent sources of borrowing
and the implications for contractual form. Our results highlight a possible reason that
13Even though, so far, we have considered h as an exogenous parameter, endogenizing it seems relatively
straightforward. We could allow banks to choose their monitoring e¤ort h at a cost. Higher transparency
(lower h) would be more costly, and competition among banks should equalize the marginal cost of additional
monitoring (reducing h) with its marginal gain in terms of borrowerssurplus in equilibrium.
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long-term debt contracts are inexible with respect to interim payments: The information
that long-term lenders would extract from these interim payments would be corrupted by
additional borrowing from hidden sources of funds. Our results also suggest an explana-
tion for simultaneous borrowing from di¤erent sources, even when there is an apparently
clear pecking order among them, and the borrowing from the cheaper source is not fully
exhausted (for example, rm loans and trade credit, or mortgages and credit card borrow-
ing when both trade credit and credit card borrowing are not costlessly observable by the
bank).
Existing literature has drawn a distinction between informal and formal lending and
highlighted that the informal sector may increase credit availability through di¤erent in-
formation and enforcement technologies. In this paper, we focus on opaque lending and, to
the extent that informal lending may be opaque, we highlight an indirect channel through
which it may diminish welfare. In particular this indirect channel is its e¤ect on lending
in the formal sector. Even though this indirect channel may be strong enough to generate
a net welfare loss, borrowers, who would (ex-ante) prefer to commit to not access informal
lending, have no means to do so, and so might nd themselves compelled to access informal
lending.
The model makes several empirical predictions. Specically, we highlight that changes
in the e¢ ciency or observability of alternative lending sources a¤ect the form and nature of
bank lending. The results on contractual form in the banking sector (where higher costs of
hidden borrowing lead to more variety) suggest that, as the informational transparency of
the nancial sector as a whole improves, more consumers take up a wider range or a more-
sophisticated set of nancial instruments from banks. Finally, we predict that borrowers
might simultaneously use expensive but hidden sources of credit, and cheaper credit from
the banking sector.
Most of the empirical predictions of the model relate to the levels of e¢ ciency and
informational transparency of alternative lenders. Cross-country comparisons show sub-
stantial di¤erences in the e¤ective level of information sharing across countries (Miller
(2003), Jentzsch, (2007)). In some countries, such as France, restrictions such as privacy-
protection laws have precluded the creation of credit bureaus. In others, the existence of
cheap-to-access and centralized public credit registers (that do not cover borrowing sources
such as small credits, credit cards or consumer credit) has also crowded private ones. The
model predicts that these di¤erences should a¤ect debt-market contracts. Along these
same lines, it is suggestive that a higher level of innovations in mortgage markets in Anglo-
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Saxon countries has not had a counterpart in continental Europe (as suggested in Green
and Wachter (2005)).
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The proof is by contradiction.
Consider a set of borrowers, A, that comprises those borrowers who in equilibrium adopt the
same repayment schedule p; q. Suppose that this schedule is strictly protable for the bank. That
is,
p+ q + (1  )E(j 2 A) D > 0:
In the interim stage, t = 1, a rival bank can o¤er only to consumers in A (that is, to those that have
chosen that particular repayment schedule) a contract with the same p and with q set just above
the break even level. That is, q0 = D p (1 )E(j2A) this would attract all the borrowers in A
and be protable for the rival bank. Thus the original outcome could not have been an equilibrium
providing a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. In order to characterize the equilibrium, we can draw on the revelation principle at t = 1
and think of the borrowers choice from the menu fp; q(p)g as a function of her type that is, we
could think of o¤ering a menu fp(); q()g.
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Formally, the Proposition claims that p() = , q() = D  (1 ) , and that all types  <
D B
2 liquidate at t =
1
2 . This last follows since the marginal type that liquidates is indi¤erent
between liquidating and receiving 0, or continuing the project and expecting a payo¤ of
(B +   q()) = (B +   D     (1  )

)
= B  D + 2:
Turning to the characterization of p() and q(): As discussed above, Proposition 1, en-
sures that any meaningful contract on the menu that is, any contract that is ever taken up in
equilibrium will break even at each stage of the contract; and so will not contain any observable
cross-subsidies. The break-even condition, given that the rst payment p =  reveals the type of
the borrower as , is that D =  + q + (1   ), so that in expectation the bank recovers its
investment. This determines that the break-even second payment is q = D p (1 )p .
Further, incentive-compatibility must be satised; that is, a borrower of type  prefers to make
a rst-period payment p() than any other p(0). We analyze the incentive-compatibility condition
by considering two deviations: imitating a lower type and imitating a higher type.
Incentive-compatibility condition 1: The contract needs to guarantee that no borrower wants to
imitate a lower-quality borrower. Suppose that a borrower of quality  claims to be a lower-quality
borrower 0 <  by paying a rst payment p = 0; in that case, her total utility would be
(  0) + (B   D   
0   (1  )0

+ ):
Note that (   0) is the additional consumption at t = 1 from reporting a lower type, while
(B   D 0 (1 )0 + ) is the net consumption in the good state (which occurs with probability
) after repaying q(0). Instead, by revealing her own type, she would get (B   D  (1 ) +).
The di¤erence between these two terms is
 (1  )(  0) < 0;
and so it cannot be optimal to claim to be a borrower of a lower type.
Incentive-compatibility condition 2: The contract also needs to guarantee that no borrower
wants to imitate a higher-quality borrower by borrowing from the hidden source and paying a rst
payment p > : Suppose, for contradiction, that a borrower claims to be a higher-quality borrower
by paying a rst payment p = 00 >  and borrowing 00    from the hidden source to fund this
payment. The total utility of the borrower would be (B  D 00 (1 )00   r(00 ) +) instead
of (B   D  (1 ) + ). The di¤erence between the two is:
(2     r)(00   ),
which is negative if and only if r > 2  , so this is the necessary and su¢ cient condition for this
incentive-compatibility condition to hold.
Finally, in the rst-best, a borrower should be funded if and only if the expected NPV of the
project is positive that is, if and only if
 D + + v(B + ) + (1  )  0:
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In the candidate equilibrium described above, banks perfectly sort borrowers and o¤er break-
even deals, so borrowers fully internalize the proceeds of their projects. Therefore, the marginal
borrower is precisely the one with NPV=0 that is at the e¢ cient level, and there is no costly,
ine¢ cient borrowing from hidden lenders, so overall e¢ ciency is maximized.
Since the contract breaks even on a type-by-type basis, there is no scope for rival banks to
make protable o¤ers at the interim stage. In addition, given that there is e¢ cient liquidation and
that the bank breaks even, there is no scope for rival banks to protably o¤er any more attractive
menus at the initial stage. Indeed, the existence of this menu as a feasible contract o¤er, suggests
that any equilibrium must maximize surplus at the initial stage in particular, this must involve
e¢ cient liquidation and no (ine¢ cient) borrowing from the hidden sector. As a result, the candidate
equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium.
It is immediate that the equilibrium involves a borrower of type  paying  to the banking
sector in the interim period and D  (1 ) , and all types  <
D B
2 liquidating at t =
1
2 .
Lemma 2 (Monotonicity of p) A borrower that earns a higher interim-period return will pay a
(weakly) higher interim repayment. (More formally, for all types  >  that do not liquidate,
p()  p()).
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Note that this lemma is instrumental to the proof of Proposition 3.
Suppose that borrowers face the choice between two generic contracts a and b and without loss
of generality, we label them so that pa > pb. The following possibilities are exhaustive: (i)  >
pa >  > pb > ; (ii) pa > pb >  >  > ; (iii)  >  >  > pa > pb; (iv)  > pa > pb >  > ;
and (v)  >  > pa > pb > .
In cases (ii), (iii), and (v), the conditions for a borrower of type  to prefer a repayment of
schedule a to one of type b are identical to the conditions for a borrower of type . It remains to
consider cases of type (i) and (iv).
In Case (i), a borrower of type  prefers schedule a to schedule b whenever
(qb   qa)  (pa   pb)(1 + ) + r(pa   ), (4)
and a borrower of type  prefers schedule b to schedule a whenever the following condition is
satised:
  pb + (B +   pb   qb)    pa + (B +   pa   qa),
or, equivalently,
(qb   qa)  (pa   pb)(1 + );
which contradicts (4).
Finally, in Case (iv), the condition for a type  borrower to prefer the b schedule is that
(qb   qa)  (pa   pb)(1 + );
and the condition for a type  borrower to prefer the a schedule is that
(qb   qa)  (pa   pb)(1 +  + r).
These two conditions are mutually incompatible.
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In all cases, therefore, it cannot be that a borrower of type  >  strictly prefers the schedule
with the rst payment pb < pa, and the borrower of type  prefers the schedule with the rst
payment pa. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. To show that with r < 2  there cannot be an equilibrium where a continuum of borrowers
are able to separate, we proceed in a similar fashion as with the proof of Proposition 2 and show
that if two borrowers that are arbitrarily close to each other are able to separate, we reach a
contradiction.
We start by conjecturing an equilibrium menu that achieves the separation of some borrowers in
a continuum and then pick two arbitrarily close borrowers  and 0 with  < 0 and p() 6= p(0).
By proposition 1 the corresponding second payments must break even, and are given by q() =
D p() (1 )
 and q(
0) = D p(
0) (1 )0
 . We know by Lemma 2 that p() < p(
0). These
payment schedules have to fulll similar incentive-compatibility conditions to the ones shown in
Proposition 2.
In particular, we can dene the two conditions as:
IC1: No borrower of a higher type (0) wants to imitate a borrower of a lower type ().
IC2: No borrower of a lower type () wants to imitate a borrower of a higher type (0).
If there is a continuum of borrowers that can individually separate, at least one of the following
situations must be true:
a) At least two arbitrarily close borrowers are neither consuming nor borrowing from a hidden
lender at t = 1.
b) At least two arbitrarily close borrowers are both consuming t = 1.
c) At least two arbitrarily close borrowers are both borrowing from a hidden lender at t = 1.
We analyze each of these situations in turn.
a) This part of the equilibrium is characterized by Proposition 2, and we know that IC2 cannot
hold in this situation if r < 2  .
b) Suppose that there is a borrower 0 that fully separates from the rest and is able to consume
at t = 1 (that is, p(0) < 0). Then, there must be a borrower , such that  < 0, that is also
able to pay p(0) without borrowing. The utility of borrower  of claiming his own type is
(B   D   p()  (1  )

+ ) + (  p()),
and the utility of imitating borrower 0 is
(B   D   p(
0)  (1  )0

+ ) + (  p(0)):
The necessary and su¢ cient condition for IC2 to hold is, therefore:
(B   D   p()  (1  )

+ ) + (  p()) > (B   D   p(
0)  (1  )0

+ ) + (  p(0)),
which simplies to: (1  )(  0) > 0, which is always false, so we reach a contradiction.
c) In this case, we start by exploring IC2.
27
A borrower of a lower type would have a utility of
((B   D   p()  (1  )

+ )  r(p()  ));
while claiming to be a higher-type borrower would yield her a utility of
(B   D   p(
0)  (1  )0

+   r(p(0)  )):
Subtracting the rst term from the second, we get a condition that must be smaller than zero for
IC2 to hold.
(B D   p(
0)  (1  )0

 r(p(0) )+) ((B D   p()  (1  )

) r(p() )+)) < 0,
which can be simplied as
(1  )(0   ) + (1  r)(p(0)  p())) < 0:
However, in this case, IC1 becomes:
(B D   p(
0)  (1  )0

 r(p(0) 0)+0) ((B D   p()  (1  )

) r(p() 0)+0)) > 0.
This expression simplies to
(1  )(0   ) + (1  r)(p(0)  p())) > 0;
which is exactly the opposite condition to the one necessary for IC2. Therefore, when two arbitrarily
close borrowers borrow and achieve separation, IC1 and IC2 are mutually incompatible, which poses
a contradiction.
This last part of the proposition follows by noting that Lemma 2 implies that for every three
borrowers with types , , and  such that  >  >  where p() = p(), it must be the case that
p() = p() = p().
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. 1) Auxiliary results
First, we dene l as the type that is just indi¤erentbetween liquidating and continuing the
project with the (p(l); q(l)) repayment schedule that corresponds to the lowest pool of borrowers.
We begin by arguing that l  p(l) and do so by contradiction: Conditional on l > p, the utility
of the indi¤erent borrower l can be expressed as l   p(l) + (B + l   q(l)). Given that liquidating
provides utility equal to zero and that the borrower is indi¤erent, this implies that
(B + l   q(l)) + l   p(l) = 0.
As l > p, then l   p(l) > 0. This implies, jointly with the condition above, that B + l   q(l) < 0,
which violates Assumption 5.
2) Proof by induction
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Next we proceed inductively, showing that if the borrower at the bottom of a pool is not
consuming, the one at the top of the pool must also not be consuming (otherwise there is a protable
deviating contract at the interim stage). Given that by Proposition 3, that there are a nite number
of di¤erent pools of borrowers, and, as above l  p(l) the result follows by induction.
It is convenient to introduce some notation: We denote the expected surplus to a borrower of
type x choosing contract ep; eq as:
Sep;eq(x) := (x  ep)1x>ep + (B + x  eq   r(ep  x)1ep>x).
Consider any interval of types, (i+1; i], that in equilibrium at the interim stage chooses a
contract p; q where i+1  p. Then, we claim that i  p. Note that we have shown that for the
lowest pool l  p(l), so that the inmum of the lowest pool satises this condition.
For contradiction, consider an alternative contract p
0
; q0 with i > p
0
> p and q0 = q   1 (p
0  
p) + " then Sp0;q0(i) = Sp;q(i) + " but
Sp0;q0(i+1)  Sp;q(i+1) =  (r   1)(p0   p)  ".
For " small and positive, Sp0;q0(i) > Sp;q(i) but Sp0;q0(i+1) < Sp;q(i+1), it follows that higher
types prefer the contract (p0; q0) to the contract (p; q), and so the contract (p0; q0) is strictly protable.
This completes the inductive step and the result.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Following Lemma 1, any equilibrium must be such that for the ith pool the rst period
payment, pi, is such that pi > i 1.
We argue that pi = i 1.
Suppose that the equilibrium includes an existing contract pi; qi with an associated pool of
borrowers (i; i 1] such that pi > i 1. We argue that a rival bank could propose an o¤er p0; q0
to borrowers (i; i 1] that is strictly protable, leading to a contradiction.
For a generic agent, , in the pool,
Spi;qi()  Sp0;q0() = (B +    qi)  r(pi   )  (B +    q0) + r(p0   )
=  (q0   qi + r(p0   pi)):
Note that  (q0   qi + r(p0   pi)) is independent of . So either all of the agents switch or none
of them do. In particular, all of them switch if qi + r(pi  p) > q. There is a protable deviation as
long as q0 > D p
0 (1 )E(j2(i 1;i])
 . In particular, a necessary condition for everyone switching
and the deviating contract being protable is
D   pi   (1  )E(j 2 (i 1; i])

+ r(pi   p0)  D   p
0   (1  )E(j 2 (i 1; i])

> 0,
or, equivalently,
(pi   p0) r   1

> 0.
Therefore whenever pi > i 1 we can nd a p0 such that pi > p0 > i 1 that is a protable
deviation. Since pi  i 1, the only possibility is that pi = i 1 and the associated breakeven
qi =
D i 1 (1 )E(j2[i;i 1])
 .
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Next, note that each threshold type i must be indi¤erent between the ith pool and the i+ 1th
pool (for i = 1; :::; n  1) and between the nth pool and liquidating for n (if n, otherwise the n
must strictly prefer taking the loan). Thus for i = 1; ::; n  1
(B + i   qi   r(i 1   i)) = (B + i   qi+1)
and
(B + n   qn   r(n 1   n)) = 0.
or (B + n   qn   r(n 1   n))> 0 if n = 0.
Substituting for the second period payments qi and qi+1 and rearranging the expressions leads
to the expressions in the statement of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Part 1 follows immediately from Proposition 2.
Next, note that if the equilibrium involves more than one pool of borrowers then (1) from
Proposition 4 applies and so
r   1
1   (1  1) = E(j 2 [i; i 1])  E(j 2 [i+1; i]) =
1 + 1
2
  1 + 2
2
, (5)
where the second equality follows from the uniform distribution assumption. This can be re-written
as 1 11 2 =
1 
2(r 1) . By denition 1 > 2 so 1 <
1 
2(r 1) or equivalently
3 
2 > r.
It is immediate, therefore, that if r < 3 2 assuming two pools of borrowers with 1 > 1 > 2
we reach a contradiction. Consequently, there can be at most a single pool of borrowers and (2)
determines the lowest borrower in this pool as n = +2D 2B+2r 3+2r+1 . It is easy to verify that
D B
2 >
+2D 2B+2r 3
+2r+1 > 0 in this range of r so some ine¢ cient project do not get liquidated.
It is also easy to calculate the break-even value of q as B 4r++2D B+2r+2rD 3+2r+1 . This is the only
feasible solution and breaks even establishing Part 3.
Finally, turning to part 2, rst note that following Proposition 4, a candidate must satisfy (1)
which can be written as i i+1i i+2 =
1 
2(r 1) and (2) which can be written as:
r 1
1  (n 1   en) =en+n 1
2   D B1  + en 1+1  .
We proceed to characterizing a proposed n-tranche candidate equilibrium, and then show that
welfare is increasing in n so that competition in the rst stage leads to a candidate with n ! 1.
Finally we show that the analysis in the limit corresponds to the expressions in the statement of
the proposition.
Characterizing an n-tranche equilibrium
We introduce some additional notation and denote the ith threshold in the n-tranche equilibrium
by (n)i where there is ambiguity about the number of tranches considered.
Following Proposition 4, an n-tranche equilibrium must satisfy (1) which can be written as

(n)
i  (n)i+1

(n)
i  (n)i+2
= 1 2(r 1) for i = 0; 1; :::; n   2 and (2) which can be written as: r 11  ((n)n 1   e(n)n ) =
e(n)n +(n)n 1
2   D B1  + e(n)n 1+1  .
It is convenient to simplify expressions a little by setting  := 1 2(r 1) and  :=
1 
 =
+2r 3
1  .
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The (1) equations can be written as i i+1i i+2 = 
Note that (n)i   (n)i+2 = (n)i   (n)i+1 + (n)i+1   (n)i+2 so that (1) can be written as:

(n)
i   (n)i+1 =
1  

(
(n)
i 1   (n)i ) = (
1  

)i(1  (n)1 ) = i(1  (n)1 ) (6)
In addition, we can write
1  (n)n = 1  (n)1 + ((n)1   (n)2 ) + :::+ ((n)n 1   (n)n )
= 1  (n)1 + (1  (n)1 ) + ::::+ n 1(1  (n)1 )
= (1  (n)1 )
1  n
1   (7)
Following Proposition 4, the remaining condition that denes the solution to the equations
characterizing an n-tranche equilibrium is that either (n)n = 0 with B+
(n)
n  q(n)n  r((n)n 1 (n)n ) >
0 or B + (n)n   q(n)n   r((n)n 1   (n)n ) = 0.
We rst prove by contradiction that (n)n > 0: Suppose that 
(n)
n = 0 then B + 
(n)
n  
D (n)n 1 (1 )

(n)
n +
(n)
n 1
2
  r((n)n 1 (n)n ) > 0 so B 
D (n)n 1 (1 )

(n)
n 1
2
  r(n)n 1 > 0 or, equivalently,
B  D   (n)n 1(+2r 32 ) > 0 which is impossible since B  D < 0, r  3 2 and (n)n 1 > 0.
Thus (n)n satises B +
(n)
n   D 
(n)
n 1 (1 )

(n)
n +
(n)
n 1
2
   r((n)n 1  (n)n ) = 0. Following (6) and
(7) (n)n 1 = 
(n)
n +n 1(1 (n)1 ) = (n)n +(1 (n)n )
n 1 n
1 n . Substituting for 
(n)
n 1 in the previous
equation allows us to characterize (n)n .
(n)n =
2(D   B) + ( + 2r   3)n 1 n1 n
4 + ( + 2r   3)n 1 n1 n
(8)
Welfare in an n-tranche equilibrium
The expressions in (2), (6) and (7) fully characterize any n-tranche candidate equilibrium.
However, bank competition in the rst stage ensures that whichever value of n maximizes welfare is
the equilibrium value of n. We therefore proceed by calculating welfare associated with an n-tranche
candidate equilibrium.
First, the welfare loss of hidden borrowing in each tranche i is
(r   1)
Z (n)i 1

(n)
i
(
(n)
i 1   x)dx =
r   1
2


(n)
i   (n)i 1
2
. (9)
It follows that the total welfare loss of hidden borrowing in the n-tranche equilibrium is
r   1
2
n 1X
i=0
(
(n)
i   (n)i+1)2 =
r   1
2
n 1X
i=0
2i(1  (n)1 )2
=
r   1
2
1 + n
1  n
1  
1 + 
(1  (n)n )2. (10)
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Overall, therefore, the welfare associated with an n-tranche candidate equilibrium is given by
W (n) =
Z 1

(n)
n
(B  D + 2x)dx  r   1
2
1 + n
1 + 
1  
1  n (1  
(n)
n )
2. (11)
Note, that following (8),
d
(n)
n
dn
= (ln )
2n 1 (1  ) (2 D   B) ( + 2r   3)
(n   n 1 + 3n 1 + n   2rn 1 + 2rn   4)2 < 0 (12)
where the inequality follows since  < 1 and so ln  < 0. Note also that as n ! 1 then (n)n !
D B
2 .
R 1
A
(B  D + 2x)dx is decreasing in A for 1 > A > D B2 (reecting that above the point
of e¢ cient liquation more surplus is generated by increasing the range of projects conducted) and
since d
(n)
n
dn < 0, it follows that
R 1

(n)
n
(B  D + 2x)dx.
Consequently a su¢ cient condition that ensures W (n) increases in n is that 1+
n
1 n (1  (n)n )2 is
decreases in n.
d
dn
(
1 + n
1  n (1  
(n)
n )
2) =
d
dn
(
4(2 D + B)2(1  2n)
(4(1  n) + ( + 2r   3)(n 1   n))2 ) (13)
= 8 (ln ) (2 K)2 4
n(1  n)  n 1( + 2r   3)(1  )
(n 1( + 2r   3)(1  ) + 4(1  n))3
< 0
where the last inequality follows on substituting for  in the denominator of the fraction to ob-
tain that 4n(1  n)  n 1( + 2r   3)(1  ) = 2

+2r 3
1 
n 
 + r   2

(+2r 3)
1 
n
and
noting that  + r   2

(+2r 3)
1 
n
increases in n and that at n = 1,  + r   2

(+2r 3)
1 

=
(+3)(2  r)
1  > 0.
This establishes that W (n) increases in n.
Characterizing the limiting equilibrium
The expressions in (2), (6) and (7) fully characterize an n-tranche equilibrium. Taking the limit
as n!1; (n)n ! D B2 and so (7) can be written as 1  D B2 = (1  1) 11  and so
1 = 1  2 (2     r)
1   (1 
D   B
2
), (14)
substituting this in (7) and substituting for  then completes the characterization in the statement
of the proposition.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. It is immediate that
di
dr
= (1  D   B
2
)2n

(+2r 3)
1 
i
 + 2r   3 > 0.
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Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. In the range r > 2  welfare is constant and equal to
W =
Z 1
D B
2
(B  D + 2x)dx =

1  D   B
2
2
In the range 2   r > 3 2 then
W = lim
n!1(1  
(n)
n )(
(n)
n + 1  (D   B)) 
r   1
2
1 + n
1 + 
1  
1  n (1  
(n)
n )
2
= (1  D   B
2
)(
D   B
2
+ 1  (D   B))  r   1
2
1  +2r 31 
1 + +2r 31 
(1  D   B
2
)2
=
1 + r
2


1  D   B
2
2
Note that at 2  ,
1+r
2 = 1.
Finally in the range 3 2  r  1 , we have
W =
Z 1
+2D 2B+2r 3
+2r+1
(B  D + 2x)dx  (r   1)
Z 1
+2D 2B+2r 3
+2r+1
(1  x)dx
= 8
r + 1
( + 2r + 1)
2

1  D   B
2
2
.
Note that r = 3 2 , 8
r+1
(+2r+1)2
= 1+r2  =
3+
4 .
Trivially, W is constant when r > 2  and increasing in r when
2 
 > r >
3 
2 . In the range
3 
2 > r  1 then ddrW = ddr (8 (+r+2)(+2r+3)2
 
1  D B2
2
) = 2 (1  3   2r) (2 D+B)2
(+2r+1)3
which has
the same sign as (1  3   2r) and is positive when 1 32 > r. Finally 1 > 1 32 establishing the
monotonicity of W throughout the relevant range.
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